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In spite of an ideological stance that should have favored free trade, the trade
policies of the Reagan years were a mixture of both free trade and protection that were not
all that different from those of preceding administrations. This paper examines the record
of the Reagan period in terms of the volume of trade itself, the levels of tariffs and
nontariff barriers, and the filings of actions under U.S. trade law. All of these indicators
present the same mixed message: that the Reagan administration was neither the bastion
of free trade that some had hoped for, nor the bastion of protection that others have
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macroeconomic policies that buffeted trading industries through an unprecedented
aggregate trade deficit and swings of exchange rates.
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I. Introduction
The Reagan administration was founded upon a commitment to free market
principles, in the international arena as well as domestically. However, there is wide
agreement hat in practice the Reagan years were marked by much less withdrawal from
government intervention in trade than in domestic economic affairs. On the contrary,
some have condemned the Reagan administration as the most protectionist since Herbert
Hoover, an astonishing criticism given the ideological stance that was consistently
maintained. In this paper I will review the record of the Reagan years as it relates to
trade and trade policy, and I will attempt to discern whether this-condemnation of that
record is justified.
Disappointment in the trade policies of the Reagan years is widely felt. Given the
free-market orientation of the administration's ideology, one might have expected to
witness a marked movement in the direction of freer trade.l Instead, the best that even
the Reagan administration itself can say about its trade policies is that "The record of the
1980s has largely paralleled that of the 1970s."2 Having participated in the Reagan
administration for a time and then left it, William Niskanen views the record more
critically:
1However, the official policy of the administration was not unambiguously in favor of free
trade, but rather espoused a possibly contradictory mix of free trade and "fair trade." The
"Administration Statement on International Trade Policy" of September, 1985, began with
the statement, "A policy of free and fair trade is in the best interest of the citizens of the
United States and the world." (USTR (1985))




Trade policy in the Reagan administration is best described as a strategic retreat.
The consistent goal of the president was free trade, both in the United States and
abroad. In response to domestic political pressure, however, the administration
imposed more new restraints on trade than any administration since Hoover. 3
And this view is evidently shared abroad, where the Economist notes, "Mr. Reagan
claimed to be a free trader, but he has been the most protectionist president for
decades."4
Charles Pearson (1989) has provided the most recent and detailed critical
evaluation of the Reagan trade record, and he finds it wanting both by the standard of free
trade and by the less demanding standard of liberal trade:
When measured against the criterion of a laissez faire, or free trade, policy the
Reagan record falls short.... Yet even when measured against the less demanding
criteria of liberal trade - resisting new import restrictions, nondiscrimination
among trade partners, a broad (traditional) view of reciprocity, minimal
subsidization or restriction of exports, and a reluctance to use trade policy to
promote foreign policy objectives - the Reagan record also falls short, and,
arguably, shorter than that of all other post-war Presidents.
The practice of U.S. trade policy in the past eight years has been characterized by
frequent rhetorical bows toward liberal trade and some actions that promote
liberal trade, but it also displayed a ready acceptance of departures based on
"political" or pragmatic considerations, not on principle. In this respect the
Reagan administration is indistinguishable from its predecessors in the postwar
era.
Readers who wish a detailed discussion of the bases for these conclusions should
read Pearson's excellent treatment directly. What I will provide here is a bit more of an
overview of the issues involved and some broad indicators of the stance of trade and trade
policy during the Reagan years.
I begin with a brief review of some of the major trade policy events of the Reagan
years. These are listed and briefly described in Table 1. They reveal what others also
have mentioned as the two distinctive threads of the trade policy of the era: continued and
3Niskanen (1988, p. 137).
4The Economist, January 21, 1989, p. 75.
5Pearson (1989, p. 2).
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increased trade restrictions and discriminatory reductions in trade restrictions. With only
two exceptions, the items listed in Table 1 fall into one or the other of these two categories.
The two exceptions are important, however, and should be mentioned first. One
was the attempt in 1982, at the first GATT Ministerial in nine years, to extend liberalized
trade to agriculture and services and to inaugurate a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations. These attempts failed, and the Ministerial ended without any major
breakthroughs, in part because of the worldwide recession but also in part because the
U.S. "backed off from [the latter] goal even before the meeting began."6
The other exception was the successful inauguration of the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations finally in 1987. Here the Reagan Administration did take
charge, not only in getting the negotiations underway, but also in forming their agenda.
The Uruguay Round negotiations are currently proceeding in a number of areas, including
not only agriculture and services, but also such new areas as intellectual property rights
and trade related investment measures.7
With the exception of these two ventures into the realm of multilateral trade
liberalization, all of the events listed in Table 1 represent either increased barriers to trade
or only discriminatory reductions in barriers. Thus, the U.S. either renegotiated existing
barriers or negotiated new ones in textiles, autos and sugar in 1981, in steel in 1982 and
1984, in machine tools and textiles in 1986, and in semiconductors in 1987. At the same
time, the U.S. eliminated trade restrictions, but only with particular trading partners, in
the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1983, the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1985, and
the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988. Given the special place that had
previously been accorded to the Most Favored Nation principle of nondiscrimination in the
GATT for the preceding 35 years, the departure from this principle in the negotiation of
these free trade agreements has been cause for concern.
6Aho and Aronson (1985, p. 20).
7See Baldwin and Richardson (1988) for extensive discussion of the Uruguay Round.
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On the other hand, the U.S. position is that these free trade agreements will
serve as stimuli to multilateral liberalization. The hope is that countries who are left out
of such bilateral arrangements will recognize the advantages of being included, and so will
be more amenable to participation in multilateral reductions in trade barriers. This could
be especially useful if the bilateral arrangements are also able to lead the way into
hitherto uncharted territories of liberalization, such as the new topics being discussed in
the Uruguay Round. The success of the US-Canada FTA in dealing with some of these
issues is indeed suggestive that this may be the case. On the other hand, until the
Uruguay Round is completed successfully, it will be impossible to know whether the short-
term adverse effects of discrimination are outweighed by the long run benefits of the
stimulus these agreements may provide to progress on the multilateral front.
Finally, I should mention one other theme of the trade policies of the Reagan
years that does not stand out as clearly in the listing of events in Table 1 but that is
nonetheless distinctive of the period. U.S. trade policies have been used actively in an
effort to induce our trading partners to open their markets, and thus to expand trade.not
just by increasing US imports but also by pressing for increases in exports, both of the
U.S. and of other countries as well.
One example of these attempts to open up foreign markets was the
Semiconductor Accord of 1986. Here the U.S. persuaded Japan to stop what was alleged
to be dumping in third country markets, and also to increase the U.S. share of the
Japanese domestic market for computer chips. This second half of the agreement, then,
was intended to remove what were perceived to be barriers to the U.S. penetration of the
Japanese market and, if' successful, would have demonstrated the ability of U.S. trade
policy to negotiate the opening of foreign markets. Unfortunately, as it turned out the
increased share of the Japanese market was not achieved, and the U.S. proceeded in 1987
to impose sanctions against a variety of imports from Japan. There has still not been
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much progress in this area, and it remains the case that this policy, which was avowedly
intended to expand trade, has had the effect of contracting it.
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U. Trade Volumes
As a first step in assessing the trade policies of the Reagan years, I look at trade
itself. There are obviously a great many factors that can influence the volume of trade
other than the stance of trade policy, and it would therefore be inappropriate to conclude
that trade policies have been, say, restrictive just because trade has not grown, or vice
versa. Nonetheless, the volume of trade surely provides the first piece of evidence that one
must look at, since it constitutes the backdrop against which other indicators of trade
policy must be viewed.
Table 2 therefore reports the volume of exports and imports of the United States
for the years 1973 through 1987. Both merchandise trade and total trade are reported, as
well as the trade balance (net exports) based on total trade. Because both exports and
imports might reasonably be expected to expand and contract with the level of overall
economic activity in the economy, and also to abstract from the considerable changes in
prices that occurred over the period, the table reports all of these values as percentages of
U.S. GNP. It appears from the table that, as fractions of GNP, exports have grown only
slightly while imports have grown considerably over the last fifteen years. Consequently,
the trade balance, which has been in deficit over most o~f this period, has grown steadily
worse.
It is somewhat difficult from the table to discern any further patterns in these
data. Figure 1 therefore illustrates the data by graphing total exports and imports as a
function of time. From this graph it is evident that while exports and imports both grew
during the 1970s, the level of exports then fell off in the 1980s while the level of imports
remained approximately constant. Thus the Reagan years have been marked by a decline
in total exports and roughly constant total imports. This is hardly the record one might
expect of a regime of liberal trade.
Of course the performance of exports and imports in the 1980s has been very
much associated with the behavior of the U.S. exchange rate. The considerable
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appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s was notorious for stimulating U.S. imports
and depressing exports, while the subsequent depreciation was expected to have the
opposite effects. The effective value (trade weighted) of the U.S. dollar is therefore also
reported in Table 2 and in Figure 1, to assist in interpreting what occurred.
From Figure 1 it appears that, while the effect of the dollar appreciation in
retarding exports is evident, the presumed effect of the appreciation in expanding imports
is not. Total imports reached their peak in 1980, before the appreciation had begun, and
remained approximately level thereafter. Thus if the appreciation did have its presumed
effect in stimulating imports, then there must have been something else happening that
offset this effect. This supports the presumption that other trade policies may have been
becoming more restrictive.
I should point out, however, that merchandise imports did behave somewhat
differently from total imports. As is shown in Table 2, merchandise imports grew from
4.6 percent of GNP in 1980 to 7.0 percent of GNP in 1987. Much of this increase can
indeed be attributed to the rising dollar. Evidently, then, the failure of total imports to
grow over this period was due to a substantial decline in non-manufacturing imports.
To check, therefore, on the sectoral performance of U.S. trade, Table 3 reports
exports, imports, and trade balances for selected years broken down by sector. From this
it is clear that primary product imports did indeed decline substantially from 1980 to
1987, and that virtually all of that decline occurred in the fuels sector. Thus, the message
given by the performance of total trade in Figure 1 may be misleading. Looking instead
only at manufacturing trade in Figure 2, the message is much more neutral. Exports fell
and imports rose after 1980 in a manner that can perhaps reasonably be attributed to the
appreciation of the dollar.
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III. Formal Trade Barriers
I turn now to an investigation of the formal trade barriers that the U.S. has
maintained against imports. While one might expect that an investigation of the openness
of U.S. trade policy would be primarily concerned with such formal barriers, it turns out
that they are not very useful indicators. The reason is that tariffs, on the one hand, have
played only a rather minor role in trade policy in recent years, while other barriers to
trade are singularly difficult to get information about. Nonetheless, an examination of
U.S. trade policies would be incomplete without at least looking at the information that
does exist.
Tariffs
Tariff levels were bound by the members of General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) at the time of its formation. Since then tariffs in all GATT members have
been reduced substantially, mostly through a succession of rounds of trade negotiations.
The levels of U.S. tariffs are therefore almost entirely reflective of these negotiations.
Since the last completed negotiation, the Tokyo Round, was completed in 1979, the
behavior of tariffs in the 1980s reflects decisions that were made in the preceding decade.
They are relevant for understanding the trade policies of the 1980s only to the extent that
any previously negotiated changes in tariffs may have posed difficulties of adjustment
during the 1980s as the negotiated reductions were put in place.
Table 4 reports the levels of Pre- and Post-Tokyo Round tariffs for the U.S. and
for an import-weighted average of seventeen other major industrialized countries. Since
the Tokyo Round tariff reductions were phased in over the eight years beginning in 1980,
these figures accurately reflect the performance of tariffs over the Reagan years.
As can be seen, tariffs have been highly uneven across sectors, even at the rather
aggregated level of the mostly 3-digit ISJIC industries reported in the table. Even before
the Tokyo Round, sectoral tariff levels in the U.S. ranged from a low of 0.5% in Paper and
Paper Products, to a high of 2 7.8% in Wearing Apparel. The range of tariff levels
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reported for the other industrialized countries was somewhat smaller, though this is
undoubtedly because of the averaging across countries. The average tariff levels in these
other countries were noticeably higher than in the U.S.
A result of the Tokyo Round was to reduce tariffs in virtually all sectors and
countries.8 The U.S. average tariff fell from 4.5% to 3.1%, while that of the other
industrialized countries fell from 7.1% to 5.5%. However, the pattern of tariffs across
industries remained roughly as it had before, and there does not seem to have been any
tendency to make very large reductions in tariffs of individual sectors, either in the U.S. or
elsewhere. It does not seem likely, therefore, that the Tokyo Round tariff cuts were large
enough to have caused noticeable dislocation in individual industries that would have
created a need for other policies to assist in the adjustment.9 On the contrary, one can
conclude that tariffs were largely irrelevant to the performance of trade policy in the
Reagan years.
Nontariff Barriers
In view of the low levels of tariffs in the industrialized countries, it is generally
regarded that other trade restricting measures, so-called nontariff barriers or NTBs,
constitute today the more important impediments to trade.10 These can in principle
include any and all policies other than tariffs that can impact on trade, but the main forms
of NTBs that get attention are import quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs).
Unfortunately even these fairly well-defined forms of NTB are notoriously difficult to
quantify, and other forms of NTB are often difficult even to document.1 1
8The Tokyo Round also had a number of other important results, many involving
nontariff barriers. See Deardorff and Stern (1983).
This conclusion has been confirmed by Deardorif and Stern (1983) and others who have
used computable general equilibrium models to evaluate the employment and other
adjustment effects of the Tokyo Round.
io5ee Deardorff (1987) for other reasons why nontariff barriers are used.
iiSe Deardorff and Stern (1985) for a discussion of these difficulties.
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Therefore most investigators of NTBs have had to make do with an admittedly
very poor and often misleading measure of the presence of NTBs: the percent of trade that
appears to be covered by them. The accuracy of this measure is itself suspect since, on
the one hand, the presence of many NTBs is difficult to ascertain, and, on the other hand,
other NTBs that are known to be present, such as quotas, may well be redundant and
hence have no effects on trade. Furthermore, even if measured accurately, this means of
quantifying of NTBs can be misleading. The more restrictive a particular NTB may be,
and hence the smaller is the volume of trade that it permits, the smaller will be the
percent of trade that it appears to cover. In the extreme, a complete import prohibition
would not show up at all in such a measure of trade coverage.
Nonetheless, there does not exist any other generally available method for
measuring NTBs, and I therefore report in Table 5 some limited information of this sort
about NTBs in the U.S. and elsewhere. Unfortunately the only data available are for the
years 1973 and 1983, which do a rather poor job of characterizing the behavior of NTBs in
the Reagan years.
What appears from the table is, first, that the overall trade coverage of NTBs did
not change much over that ten year stretch. The trade coverage by NTBs in the U.S. did
fall, but only slightly, from 22.3% to 19.3%. Given the inaccuracy of the measure being
used, that is hardly a significant change. Furthermore, by this measure the coverage by
NTBs in the other industrialized countries actually rose a tiny bit.2 Therefore by this
measure it does not appear that nontariff barriers either increased or decreased
significantly during the second half of the 1970s and early 80s. .
There do appear, however, to have been noticeable changes in NTBs in a few
particular sectors. The trade coverage by NTBs declined substantially, for example, in the
food, apparel, footwear, and printing and publishing industries, while it increased
1 Because the source for these data did not happen to include the Cornmon Agricultural
Policy of the European Economic Community in 1973, but did include it in 1983, I have
excluded European agriculture completely from the calculation.
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substantially in wood products, metal products, and transportation equipment. Thus there
is evidence, if not of protectionism, at least of activism in the use of nontariff trade
barriers.
It is unfortunate that these data, poor as they are, do not extend through the
remainder of the Reagan years. One can only speculate on what these trade coverage
measures would look like today. I noted in Table 1 a number of NTBs that were instituted
after 1983, including the expansion of the coverage of the VER on steel, the VER on
machine tools, and the semiconductor accord. Also, in its 1986 renewal the multifiber
arrangement was extended and tightened. At the same time, I am not aware of any
important NTBs that have been removed since 1983, except for the lapsing of the VER on
automobiles from Japan that has nonetheless been extended by Japan voluntarily.
Therefore it appears that when data comparable to Table 5 do become available for a more
recent year, they will probably show an expansion, not a contraction, of the trade coverage
of NTBs during the Reagan years.
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IV. Administered Protection
It is sometimes argued (notably by Canada) that the most pernicious barriers to
U.S. imports are not the formal barriers that exist for long periods of time, but rather the
administrative and legal arrangements that we have for interfering with trade on a short-
term basis whenever another country exports to us too successfully. These arrangements
are sometimes concocted informally (as in the VERs on autos and steel discussed above),
but most of them arise during the often very active administration of U.S. trade law. It
may therefore be instructive to examine the record of trade actions under U.S. law to see
whether this avenue for protection has been used more frequently and/or more successfully
during the Reagan years.
Table 6 reports the numbers of cases filed and successful under each of five
sections of the Trade Acts of 1974 and 1979. These numbers are taken from a
computerized inventory of trade actions that has been assembled and maintained by my
colleague, John H. Jackson. For the purpose of the table I have sorted the completed cases
by the latest date for which any action was taken, excluding dates of any court challenges,
and I have omitted any cases that were still pending. Cases are classified as successful
only if all relevant agencies made affirmative determinations and if some form of import
relief was thereafter provided. For sections of the law in which there is presidential
discretion, then, the successful cases include only those for which the president did provide
some relief.1 3 The tabulation includes filings under the escape clause14 (section 201 of
13If a case was decided negatively by the agencies but nonetheless led to some form of
relief by the president, as was the case with autos in 1981, then the case has been counted
as unsuccessful. This biases the number of successful cases downward somewhat, though
such cases are unusual.
14The escape clause is the U.S. implementation of the safeguard clause, Artlicle XIX, of
the GATT. It permits firms and workers in industries that are injured by imports to seek
temporary protection from those irnports. There is no presurnption in an escape clause
action that the foreign importers are behaving unfairly.
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the 1974 Trade Act) and the two major statutes involving unfair trade15 (sections 301
and 337) from 1975 onward. It includes filings of countervailing duty cases16 and anti-
dumping duty cases17 (sections 701 and 731 of the 1979 Trade Act) only since 1980, due
to the fact that these sections of the law were substantially modified in the 1979 Act.
The numbers convey a mixed message. Certainly the flow of cases has been
substantially greater during the 1980s than before. This increase is exaggerated in the
table by the fact that pre-1980 filings of countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases are
excluded. However, the revision of the law in 1979 had the effect of shifting many of what
would have been escape clause actions to these latter two categories, so that the total is
not as misleading as it may at first appear.
The percentage of successful cases overall has also gone up. As indicated in the
lower right of the Table, 29% of the cases filed during the Reagan years were successful,
while only 22% were successful during the 1975-80 period.
On the other hand, much of this shift is also accounted for by the shift to use of
the countervailing duty and anti-dumping statutes. The percentage of successful cases
under each of the first three statutes actually fell during the Reagan years. Thus one
could argue that the Administration has in fact been more stringent in deciding and acting
upon trade cases of particular types, and that it has only been the changing composition of
the cases that has caused the success rate to increase.
15Section 301 is a broad statute that permits industries to seek government action when
foreign governments engage in unfair trade practices, usually against U.S. exports.
Section 337 is a much more specific statute, usually used to deal with foreign infringement
of U.S. patent and other intellectual property rights.
16 Countervailing duties are the tools, permitted by the GATT, for retaliating against
foreign government subsidies that affect trade. Industries that can establish that they are
competing with subsidized imports can seek tariff protection equal to the subsidy under
Section 701.
1Dumping is defined as exporting for a price that is either below the home market price or
below cost. Industries can file for protection from such dumping, in the forrn of an anti-
dumping duty equal to such price differential, under Section 731.
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Nor can one necessarily ascribe any increase in either cases filed or cases
successful to the actions of the administration. In 1979 the Congress made deliberate
changes in the requirements for getting trade relief under the law, with the intent of
making that relief more easy to get. Judging from the numbers in Table 6, those changes
in the law were quite successful in achieving their objective.
Whoever may deserve the credit or the blame for these results, the fact remains
that during the 1980s petitioners have had a better than one in three chance of getting
relief from trade competition by filing under the U.S. trade laws. Considering the low cost
to the petitioner of such a filing in comparison to the benefit that may accrue if protection
is granted, these odds must provide quite an incentive to make use of the system. I would
conclude that objections to the U.S. system of administered protection are well founded.
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V. Fear of Trade Intervention
Often international trade can be hampered as much by traders' fears of future
trade intervention as by actual trade actions that have already occurred. To the extent
that such trade actions are written formally into law, this is the concern about
administered protection that was just discussed. But a protectionist environment can also
give rise to pressures to create new forms of protection, and traders are well aware that
securing a share of the U.S. market is no guarantee that access to that market will be
continued. On the contrary, import competing firms are often adept at using the political
process to promote special measures of trade protection that are in their own interests.
And knowledge that this may happen, even though the exact mechanism of that protection
may not be known in advance, must enter the decision of a foreign exporter as to whether
to attempt to penetrate the market or not. Therefore it is important, in evaluating the
trade policies of the Reagan years, also to consider what the political atmosphere was as it
pertained to trade, and therefore whether trade may have been deterred by fears of new
protection.
Unfortunately, I know of no feasible way to get a handle on the possible
protectionist atmosphere that may have prevailed. Precisely because the focus is actions
that did not occur, but were only feared, there probably can be no objective measure of
what those fears were.
On the other hand, there were at least two "non-events" of the 1980s that
suggest that protectionist sentiments may have been at a high ebb. The first was the push
for domestic content legislation in the automobile industry in the early 1980s. This was
ultimately defeated, but the same sentiments that propelled that legislation certainly
contributed to the decision to impose a VER on Japanese exports. Furthermore, it appears
that the fear of such legislation, along with the VER itself, has been an important factor in
leading Japanese auto companies to invest in production facilities in the United States.
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The second non-event was the Gephardt amendment. This amendment to the
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 was ultimately defeated, but not before it had propelled
Gephardt himself into the political limelight. The perception that a country's bilateral
trade surplus with the U.S. may ultimately lead the U.S. to restrict imports from that
country has surely not faded away completely, judging from the efforts that a number of
exporting countries have taken to try to restrict their exports to the U.S. If governments
continue to be concerned about a future protectionist response to these trade imbalances,
then surely the firms within those countries who contemplate exporting must share these
concerns and take them into account in their decisions.
As the background of the Gephardt amendment suggests, one of the major causes
of protectionist feelings in the 1980s has been the aggregate trade deficit. The trade deficit
has fostered the perception that foreign exporters were somehow "beating us" at the game
of trade, as well as the rationalization that they were beating us by playing unfairly. The
trade deficit itself was accompanied, in the first half of the decade, by the tremendous
appreciation of the dollar that priced many American goods out of world markets, and this
too made the pressures of import competition more acute and added to the clamor for
protection. After 1985, as shown in Figure 1, the dollar did decline, and this made it
easier for U.S. firms to compete and should have eased the pressure for protection. But
the fact that the aggregate trade deficit did not improve with this depreciation, at least
initially, may have strengthened the hand of the protectionists even further. For they
could argue that the foreign companies and governments were somehow not allowing
market forces to work.
Now this is not the place to explain or criticize the policies that may have led to
the heightened U.S. trade deficit, or to these two large rnovements in the value of the
dollar. These are issues better left to others who will evaluate the macroeconomic policies
of the Reagan years. Suffice it to say only that the trade balance and the exchange rate
are both reflections of macroeconomic policies, not of trade policies at the micro level.
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However, while the causes of the deficit and the exchange rate movements are
macroeconomic, their effects certainly extend into the determination of the level of trade.
The role of the exchange rate itself in determining exports and imports has already been
discussed. But what is important here is the additional effect that both the deficit and the
exchange rate may have in contributing to a protectionist environment. And this
environment is in turn a deterrent to trade.
I conclude this section of the paper by looking at the one objective indicator of
fears of protection, albeit a very limited one, that I was able to assemble. This is the flow
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States. Because the U.S. has permitted
a relatively free flow of foreign investment throughout the postwar period, foreign firms
that have feared that access to our domestic market through trade might be denied have
had the option of investing in that market directly. There are of course many other
motives for FDI other than fear of protection, but it is nonetheless worth having a look to
see whether the inflow of FDI may have increased during the Reagan years.
Table 7, therefore, presents the data for FDI for the period 1973-1987. It does
appear that total FDI into the U.S. attained new highs in the 1980s, especially in the last
few years. This is especially true for total investment, though it is also true to a lesser
extent for investment in manufacturing alone. The patterns of these data are more easily
seen graphically, and I have therefore graphed them over time in Figure 3. Once again,
as a simple way of normalizing for growth in both prices and overall economic activity, the
data are graphed in Figure 3 as a percent of U.S. GNP.
The message here is that FDI into the U.S. has certainly increased, though not at
all smoothly. A peak was reached already in 1981, and this was not surpassed until
1987. To what extent this increase in FDI was motivated by fears of protection is, of
course, impossible to determine here.
I would conclude, however, that fears of protection have in fact been substantial
during the Reagan years. This conclusion is based, admittedly, as much on memory of the
18
tone of press reports and public policy discussions during the period as on any hard
evidence. But the experience with the Gephardt amendment is also strongly suggestive
that protectionism, if it could be called by a different name, was a popular cause. And the




I do not believe that there is any very clear-cut conclusion to be drawn from the
evidence presented in this paper. At each stage, the evidence I have found has been at
best weak, and often contradictory. The volume of total trade, for example, seemed to
stagnate during the Reagan years, while the volume of manufacturing trade did not.
Trade barriers in the form of tariffs declined over the period, but solely as a result of the
Tokyo Round that had been negotiated in the 1970s. Trade barriers in other forms do not
seem to have increased in their trade coverage, at least as of 1983, though they did change
their sectoral incidence and it does seem likely that the coverage may have increased after
1983. Filings under the various sections of the U.S. trade acts, whereby industries can
seek relief from foreign competition for various reasons, did increase substantially after
1980. However the increase also reflected a shift away from use of the escape clause and
the unfair trade statutes and towards the countervailing duty and anti-dumping statutes
that had been revised by Congress in 1979. Therefore the increase in filings seems to
reflect that change in law, and not necessarily any policy of the Reagan years, and this is
supported by the fact that there was not any particular increase in the success rate of
petitions under the statutes that had not been revised. Finally, there is anecdotal evidence
that the 1980s saw an increase in protectionist pressures, and therefore perhaps in the
fears of protection by potential foreign exporters, and this is consistent with the admittedly
sporadic increase in the inflow of foreign direct investment that occurred. But this is not
hard evidence, and the inflow of FDI can as easily be ascribed to a variety of other causes,
many of which would reflect positively on the Reagan administration.
Therefore, in answer to the question of "how well" the Reagan administration
performed in the area of trade policy, I can only say that the evidence is mixed. As an
enthusiastic advocate of free trade myself, I would ce'rtainly not say that the record of the
Reagan years was the answer to my prayers. But on the other hand I find it difficult to
see the basis for the view quoted in the introduction that Reagan was the most
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protectionist president since Hoover. I am forced, however reluctantly, to agree more or
less with the administration's own self evaluation: that the record was largely similar to
that of previous administrations.
Like previous administrations, the Reagan administration did take the lead
- with eventual though not immediate success - in initiating a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations, and this round promises to expand the province of liberal trade. At the
same time the administration gave in more frequently than one might like to pressures for
protection in particular sectors. The most distinctive contributions to liberalizing trade
that were made by the Reagan administration took the form of bilateral agreements that,
while they are almost certainly beneficial, are not an unmixed blessing because of their
discriminatory nature. At the same time a number of the administration's trade actions
that were most deplored by prophets of liberal trade, such as the semiconductor pact with
Japan, were taken with the avowed purpose of opening foreign markets. Thus, again, the
trade policies of the Reagan years were a contradictory lot, but this is hardly a novelty
among recent administrations in the United States.
There remains the question of assessing who should bear responsibility for this
mixed bag of trade policies. It is tempting for his critics to say that the president himself
should bear full responsibility for both the good and the bad, since it is his job to lead the
Congress and the public (and some would say even the world) onto the high road of liberal
trade. It must be equally tempting for members of the Reagan administration itself to
seek credit for those policies that did succeed in opening markets, while blaming the
Democratic Congress, the self-interested public, or under-handed foreigners for creating
situations that forced the administration to choose among the lesser of various protectionist
evils.
It is not hard to muster sympathy for the latter view. Robert Baldwin (1982)
(who probably would not share this view) has aptly described the formation of trade policy
as being the result of an interaction between a supply of protection and a demand for
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protection. In this view, the administration has the power to supply protection to those
who request it, but is reluctant to use that power except when the pressure on it is very
strong. It is various private interests within the economy, typically import competing
industries, that are the principal demanders of protection, and they make their demands
known through lobbyists and through their elected representatives in the Congress who act
as market intermediaries, supplying protection that they have in turn demanded from the
administration. Demanders of protection pay a price for it in the form of political action,
while the suppliers of protection benefit from that political action in furthering other
political objectives such as reelection.
In this view, then, the equilibrium level of protection is the outcome of the
interaction between both supply and demand, and changes in protection cannot be
automatically attributed to either one alone. An increase in protection, for example, could
be the result of an outward shift of the demand for protection, and hence be the "fault" of
the protectionist forces that impinge on the administration. Or it could be the result of an
outward shift in supply of protection, and hence be the "fault" of an administration that
has gone soft in resisting otherwise unchanged protectionist pressures.
Thus even if we grant that protection did increase during the Reagan years
(which as I've argued is not necessarily the case), we could still absolve the Reagan
administration itself from responsibility for that increase by noting that the 1980s were
marked by protectionist pressures that were unprecedented in the post-war period. That
these pressures did exist, I think, there can be no doubt.
However, I would conclude by pointing out that Baldwin's neat analogy of trade
policy formation to price formation in the analysis of a market can also suggest extending
that analysis to a general equilibrium system. In general equilibrium it is not enough to
explain a change just by noting a shift in supply or demand; one must also examine why
the shift took place and how it may have reflected other shifts in other markets.
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In the context of the Reagan-years trade policy, what this suggests is that one
ask why there may have been a shift to greater demands for protection during the 1980s.
And I have already alluded to the answer to that: the increased aggregate trade deficit
and the accompanying changes in the value of the dollar implied tremendous pressure on
many of the industries in tradable sectors of the U.S. economy, and they responded to that
pressure by seeking protection.
Thus, while I would not suggest that the Reagan administration was more
accommodating to protectionist interests than previous administrations, I would not hold
the Reagan administration blameless for the increased demands for protection that
occurred. For these were the indirect byproduct of other policies that contributed to the
U.S. trade deficit and the appreciation of the dollar. These latter policies are rightly the
subject of other contributions to this conference. But it is worth noting in closing that less
damage may have been done to the liberal trading system of the world by some of the
more egregious protectionist acts of the Reagan administration, such as the proliferation of
VERs, than by the macroeconomic policies of the Reagan administration that were not, on
their face, intended to effect trade at all.
23
REFERENCES
Aho, C. Michael and Jonathan David Aronson (1985) Trade Talks: America Better Listen!
(Council on Foreign Relations, New York).
Baldwin, Robert E. (1982) "The Political Economy of Protection," in Jagdish Bhagwati, ed.,
Import Competition and Response, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago), pp. 263-
286.
Baldwin, Robert E. and J. David Richardson (1988) eds., Issues in the Uruguay Round
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.).
Cline, William R. (1987) The Future of World Trade in Textiles and Apparel (Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.).
Council of Economic Advisors (1989) Economic Report of the President (U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.).
Deardorff, Alan V. (1987) "Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers?" Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 26 (Spring), pp. 191-216.
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern (1983) "Economic Effects of the Tokyo Round,"
Southern Economic Journal, 49 (January), pp. 605-624.
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern (1985) Methods of Measurement of Non-Tariff
Barriers United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/ST/MD/
28 (January).
Niskanen, William A. (1988) Reaganomics (Oxford University Press, New York).
Pearson, Charles S. (1989) Free Trade, Fair Trade: The Reagan Record (The University
Press of America, Lanham, Md.).
Tarr, David G. (1989) A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment
Effects of US Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel (Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D.C.).
Thompson, Aileen (1989) "A Study of the United States-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement," in process.
USTR, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1985) "Administration Statement on
International Trade Policy," September 23.

Table 1
Calendar of Major Trade Policy Events
of the Reagan Years
Year Event Description









1984 Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984
1985 US-Israel FTA
The second renewal of the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA III) was negotiated,
continuing a trend toward tightening its
restrictions that had begun with MFA II.
The U.S. negotiated with Japan to limit
automobile exports to the U.S.
The existing system of sugar price supports
was facillitated by means of a system of
quotas.
A GATT Ministerial Meeting was held in Geneva
but failed to make any major breakthroughs
and did not succeed in launching a new
of trade negotiations.
The U.S. negotiated a comprehensive quota
on steel imports from each country of
Europe. Further restrictions and
agreements regarding steel followed.
The U.S. extended preferential access to
countries in the Caribbean Basin.
An ITC recommendation for quotas on steel
was rejected, and instead VERs were
negotiated with all major suppliers except
Canada.
Renewed Generalized System of Preferences.
Reduced tariffs on about 100 products.
Strengthened authority to retaliate against
unfair trade practices.
Broadened criteria for injury in escape
clause cases.
Provided authority to establish bilateral
free trade areas.
A free trade agreement was negotiated between
Israel and the U.S.
Table 1 (continued)
Year Event Description
1986 Machine tool VER







1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act
Negotiated voluntary export restraints on
tool imports from four countries.
The third renewal of the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA IV) was negotiated,
extending it for five years. At U.S.
insistence, the restrictions on textile
trade were extended and tightened.
Japan agreed to stop dumping chips in third
country markets and to increase the U.S.
of the Japanese chip market.
Approval of agenda to
launch the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
The U.S. imposed sanctions against certain
imports from Japan in response to
violations of the 1986 accord.
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations was begun.
Negotiations (begun in 1986) for a free trade
agreement between the U.S. and Canada
were completed.
Provided authority for Uruguay Round trade
negotiations.
Shifted authority for some aspects of trade
policy to the U.S. Trade Representative.
Made retaliation against some unfair trade
practices mandatory.
Sources: Aho and Aronson (1985), Cline (1987), Niskanen (1988), Tarr (1989), Thompson
(1989), and various issues of the Wall Street Journal.
Table 2
U.S. Trade and Exchange Rates, 1973-1987
Trade as Percent of GNP
Effective
Year Merchandise Merchandise Total Total Net Exchange
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Rate
1973 3.2 3.3 5.2 5.4 -0.2 98.8
1974 4.2 3.8 6.5 6.9 -0.4 99.2
1975 4.3 3.3 6.5 6.1 0.4 93.9
1976 4.2 3.5 6.2 6.8 -0.6 97.3
1977 3.9 3.8 5.8 7.4 -1.7 93.1
1978 4.1 4.3 6.1 7.7 -1.5 84.2
1979 4.6 4.5 6.9 8.8 -1.9 83.2
1980 5.1 4.6 7.8 9.3 -1.5 84.4
1981 5.0 4.7 7.4 8.9 -1.5 100.8
1982 4.4 4.6 6.5 8.0 -1.5 111.7
1983 3.8 4.8 5.7 7.9 -2.2 117.3
1984 3.9 6.0 5.7 9.0 -3.3 128.5
1985 3.7 6.3 5.3 8.9 -3.7 132.0
1986 3.7 6.8 5.1 9.0 -3.9 103.3
1987 4.0 7.0 5.4 9.3 -3.9 90.6
Source: Adapted from GATT, International Trade, selected issues, and Economic Report of the President, 1989.
Table 3
Total Merchandise Exports, Imports, and Trade Balances
By Commodity Groups for the United States,
Selected Years, 1973-1987, Billions of Dollars
Trade


































































































































Commodity Group Year Exports Imports Balance
Manufactures












































































































































































































































































































Note: Totals may not agree due to rounding; exports f.o.b.; imports c.i.f.
Source: Adapted from GATT, International Trade, 1980/81, 1983/84, and 1987/88.
Table 4
Tariff Levels of the U.S. and Other Industrialized Countriesa
Pre- and Post-Tokyo Round, Percent




U.S. Industrialized U.S. Industrialized
'Agr., For., & Fishing 1 2.2 8.9 1.8 9.2
Food, Bev., & Tobacco 310 6.3 13.6 4.7 12.3
Textiles 321 14.4 10.6 9.2 8.4
Wearing Apparel 322 27.8 18.7 22.7 15.5
Leather Products 323 5.6 4.3 4.2 3.0
Footwear 324 8.8 14.4 8.8 13.3
Wood Products 331 3.6 2.6 1.7 2.5
Furniture & Fixtures 332 8.1 10.3 4.1 7.4
Paper & Paper Products 341 0.5 7.3 0.2 5.3
Printing & Publishing 342 1.1 3.1 0.7 1.7
Chemicals 35A 3.8 9.8 2.4 7.0
Petrol. & Rel. Prod. 35B 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4
Rubber Products 355 3.6 6.4 2.5 4.4
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. 36A 9.1 5.3 5.3 3.8
Glass & Glass PrQducts 362 10.7 10.4 6.2 8.1
Iron & Steel - 371 4.7 5.9 3.6 4.4
Nonferrous Metals 372 1.2 2.2 0.7 1.9
Metal Products 381 7.5 9.3 4.8 6.2
Nonelectric Machinery 382 5.0 7.0 3.3 4.8
Electric Machinery 383 6.6 10.5 4.4 7.8
Transportation Equip. 384 3.3 8.9 2.5 7.5
Miscellaneous Manufac. 38A 7.8 7.7 4.2 4.9
Total Traded 4.5 7.1 3.1 5.5
aOther industrialized countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the European Economic
Community (Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom)
Source: Based on data supplied by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Table 5
Percent of Trade Covered by Nontariff Barriers
in the U.S. and Other Industrialized Countriesa
1973 and 1983
1973 1983
Industry ISIC Other Other
U.S. Industrialized U.S. Industrialized
Agr., For., & Fishingb 1 1.4 43.9 2.9 18.4
Food, Bev., & Tobacco 310 45.4 19.6 31.1 63.2
Textiles 321 41.3 28.1 43.5 38.1
Wearing Apparel 322 66.1 41.2 4.1 56.9
Leather Products 323 0.0 1.3 0.0 12.5
Footwear 324 51.2 29.1 25.2 10.8
Wood Products 331 0.0 0.0 59.3 6.6
Furniture & Fixtures 332 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9
Paper & Paper Products 341 0.0 0.8 0.6 8.9
Printing & Publishing 342 60.6 4.4 4.6 2.0
Chemicals 35A 0.0 4.6 1.6 7.5
Petrol. & Rel. Prod. 35B 56.2 45.1 39.1 15.4
Rubber Products 355 0.0 4.0 3.5 8.5
Nonmetallic Min. Prod. 36A 0.0 9.8 4.0 10.3
Glass & Glass Products 362 0.0 0.0 5.1 2.3
Iron & Steel 371 10.0 7.7 9.8 25.0
Nonferrous Metals 372 0.0 8.5 0.5 4.2
Metal Products 381 0.0 3.1 13.9 4.2
Nonelectric Machinery 382 0.0 2.2 1.9 4.4
Electric Machinery 383 8.3 6.7 4.0 13.1
Transportation Equip. 384 1.8 13.4 5.7 28.2
Miscellaneous Manufac. 38A 0.5 3.4 5.4 9.1
Total Traded 22.3 18.6 19.3 18.7
a Other industrialized countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the European Economic
Community (Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom)
bCoverage for agriculture excludes the European Economic Community due to
lack of data on the Common Agricultural Policy.
Source: World Bank tape.
Table 6
Trade Actions Filed and Successful, 1975-1988
Subtotals
Trade Action (Section) Year 1975- 1981- Total
1980 1988
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
ESCAPE CLAUSE (201)
Cases Filed 3 12 11 10 2 5 2 1 2 5 2 4 43 16 59
Successful 0 1 2 3 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 9 3 12
% Successful 0 8 18 30 50 40 0 0 100 20 0 0 21 19 20
UNFAIR TRADE (301)
Cases Filed 1 2 3 1 1 8 2 8 1 7 4 4 3 6 16 35 51
Successful 0 2 3 0 1 7 1 1 0 5 3 4 3 3 13 20 33
%Successful 0 100 100 0 100 88 50 13 0 71 75 100 100 50 81 57 65
UNFAIR TRADE (337)
Cases Filed 2 18 10 9 22 16 19 20 22 37 40 17 21 16 77 192 269
Successful 2 2 3 2 9 5 5 5 3 9 10 3 3 3 23 41 64
% Successful 100 11 30 22 41 31 26 25 14 24 25 18 14 19 30 21 24
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (701)
Cases Filed 67 17 100 20 12 36 16 14 2 67 217 284
Successful 1 1 6 14 5 7 7 7 1 1 48 49
% Successful 1 6 6 70 42 19 44 50 50 1 22 17
ANTI-DUMPING (731)
Cases Filed 31 13 53 41 37 78 65 52 12 31 351 382
Successful 6 5 4 17 16 11 30 31 7 6 121 127
9% Successful 19 38 8 41 43 14 46 60 58 19 34 33
TOTAL
Cases Filed 6 32 24 20 25 127 53 182 86 98 160 106 90 36 234 811 1045
Successful 2 5 8 5 11 21 12 16 36 36 31 44 44 14 52 233 285
% Successful 33 16 33 25 44 17 23 9 42 37 19 42 49 39 22 29 27
Source: From a trade action database maintained by John H. Jackson.
Table 7
Foreign Direct Investment into the United States, 1973-1987, Millions of Dollars
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total 2656 3695 1414 2687 3728 7897 11877 16918 25195 13792 11946 25359 19022 34091 41977
Manufacturing 1120 1646 593 625 1414 3197 3672 5755 7445 2742 3542 3992 8049 11865 20443
Selected Industries
Agriculture 189 146 83 50 -9 -29 111 233
Dairy Products 12 48 31 30 1 127 199 10
Ferrous Metals 29 138 -187 -290 284 -289 208 98
Textiles and Apparel 2 72 1 -4 47 36 270 247
Lumber and Wood Productsa 40 -19 11 -7 -43 59
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 222 -35 315 300 99 235 362 217
aData for 1985,86 suppressed to avoid disclosure for individual companies.
Source: Survey of Current Business, various issues
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